

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/10089

3 November 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 40/81)



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

JPRS L/10089

3 November 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

(FOUO 40/81)

CONTENTS

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

- PLO's Khalil al-Wazir Interviewed
(Khalil al-Wazir Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 9 Oct 81) 1

IRAQ

- Hammadi Attacks U.S. Role in Mideast
(Richard Owen; THE TIMES, 6 Oct 81) 5

LIBYA

- Al-Turayki Discusses 6th Fleet Movements, Mubarak
(REUTER, 11 Oct 81) 6
- Al-Qadhdhafi Welcomes Afghan Official
(Martin Walker; THE GUARDIAN, 1 Sep 81) 7

MOROCCO

- Arrest of Previously Immune Bouabid Discussed
(Hamid Barrada; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 23 Sep 81) 8

SAUDI ARABIA

- Foreign Minister Urges U.S.-PLO Contacts
(Paul Eedle; REUTER, 18 Sep 81) 14
- Yamani Launches New U.K. Magazine
(Michael Horsnell; THE TIMES, 1 Oct 81) 16

SUDAN

- Al-ier Comments on Western Role in Africa
(Abel Al-ier Interview; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 5 Sep 81) 17

- a -

[III - NE & A - 121 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Envoy to Cairo Comments on U.S. Arms Decision (Christopher Walker; THE TIMES, 13 Oct 81)	19
Numayri Urges U.S., EEC To Boycott Libyan Oil (Numayri Interview; THE TIMES, 14 Oct 81)	21
YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC	
War Seen Bringing Regime to Verge of Collapse (James Adams; THE SUNDAY TIMES, 6 Sep 81)	23
Interview With Premier Dr 'Abd al-Karim al-Iryan (Abd al-Karim al-Iryani Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 9 Oct 81) .	25
Briefs Jets Attack Guerrilla Strongholds	29

- b -

USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PLO'S KHALIL AL-WAZIR INTERVIEWED

JN120940 Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 9 Oct 81 pp 35-39

[Interview with Khalil al-Wazir, alias Abu Jihad, deputy commander in chief of the Palestinian revolution forces, by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI correspondent Florence Ra'd, in Tunis and by telephone from Paris--date not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] Do you think that the PLO leadership is the target at this stage? Can it be said that someone wants Yasir 'Arafat's head?

[Answer] After the 15-day war in July, which scored a military and moral victory for the Palestinian revolution and the joint forces whose political repercussions were seen in the Zionist enemy's arena, it became clear that Begin's government and the U.S. administration are preparing for a political onslaught to besiege the Palestinian revolution after their destructive onslaughts to wreck the structure, positions, capability and command centers of the joint forces had failed. This Zionist-U.S. plot is coupled with another sabotage scheme to arouse confusion in the Lebanese arena. This is being embodied today in the car bomb phenomenon and the human, material and psychological consequences which aim to arouse disgust and pain. They will not hesitate to resort to direct and indirect attempts against the leaders or through their agents in order to achieve the psychological victory they are seeking.

[Question] There are tendentious rumors linking the recent wave of explosions with the Palestinian stand on the Saudi project. To what degree can these rumors be believed?

[Answer] Psychological warfare is part of the U.S.-Zionist onslaught and campaign against the Palestinian revolution and the joint forces. This war is being expanded to sabotage the Palestinian-nationalist Lebanese relationship, the Palestinian-Syrian relationship or the nationalist Lebanese-Syrian relationship. We should never forget that the primary beneficiary of these explosions and the moving hand of the agents is the Zionist enemy which has the green light from the Reagan administration.

[Question] Are the new onslaughts, the Saudi project and the Palestinian stand related to each other?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Answer] I do not see a specific relationship between the Saudi project and the Palestinian stand. We as Palestinians have not given our opinion on this project. The rumors being circulated regarding our position are part of the psychological war which the hostile forces are trying to wage to fragment Arab ranks more than they are divided now.

[Question] How would you describe Palestinian-Syrian relations in light of the recent developments after the steadfastness conference and prior to the Arab summit to convene in Rabat?

[Answer] We are going through a battle of life and death. Our Zionist enemy is waging a war against the existence of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. In light of our understanding of the nature of this battle and our observation of developments in the Arab reality we are experiencing, the importance of the unity of Palestinian-nationalist Lebanese-Syrian struggle has deepened to confront U.S.-Zionist machinations which realize that these combined forces form a solid confrontation base.

[Question] Do you expect an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon? What are the chances of such an invasion happening?

[Answer] Since the cease-fire, the Zionist leadership has been paving the way for the next aggression through a series of steps begun by Menahem Begin in his memorandum to Haig and through the United Nations, in this memorandum, Begin claimed that the PLO is reorganizing its forces in the south and that this constitutes a violation of the cease-fire. He also claimed that the Palestinian forces are massing men, arms and materiel and that more than 20 tons of equipment and arms have arrived in the south.

Whatever the circumstances, the Palestinian and Lebanese leaderships are closely watching the constant possibility that the Begin government, backed by the United States, is seeking to score a military victory that will be part of the victories and gains which Begin wants to crush revolutionary presence and carry out the autonomy projects.

[Question] The PLO has requested an emergency Arab summit be held. Lebanon as well has moved in this direction. Are you in agreement with Lebanon on this step?

[Answer] We support an Arab summit that would discuss the main issue: The Zionist danger threatening Lebanon and the Arab homeland. As far as we know, however, the Lebanese Government's request is restricted to a discussion of the southern Lebanese issue. We believe that this issue is part of the major issue that should be discussed at future Arab summits. We do not think we are in conflict with the Lebanese stand on this point.

[Question] What is the Palestinian view on Prince Fahd's initiative? Some have said that it embarrassed the Syrians and encircled the Palestinians.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Answer] (Jokingly) Why was the question posed in this fashion? I can only discuss the Palestinian viewpoint.

[Question] All right, as you wish.

[Answer] A great deal has been said about the initiative. We have declared on various occasions and at press conferences that we consider it extremely important, particularly regarding the condemnation of the Americans who support the Zionist aggression. We said that this condemnation should be transformed into a loud Arab cry against the United States which is the Zionist enemy's political umbrella and which is extending to this enemy all forms of material aid and backing.

Regarding the points raised by Prince Fahd, we announced that the Palestinian command institutions will study these points and give an opinion on them. At this juncture, I shall make an essential remark which should be obvious: The Zionist enemy has rejected the Saudi proposals and the United States has refrained from giving a frank opinion on them; rather, reports by news agencies make us sense that there are U.S. reservations regarding these proposals which are closer to rejection than acceptance. Therefore, we believe that the stands announced by the United States and the Zionist enemy place this initiative at present in the realm of stagnation.

At any rate, we as Palestinians have the Palestine National Council's resolutions which have specified the landmarks of the solution of our issue and what is compatible and what is incompatible with these landmarks. The Palestinian revolution will express its opinion in light of these resolutions.

[Question] I do not understand. Are you with or against the initiative and why?

[Answer] We have not yet announced our official stand, particularly regarding the point dealing with indirect recognition of Israel through recognition of the right of the states in the region to live in peace.

[Question] There are those who say that the Saudi plan is the springboard for a post-Camp David stage. What is your opinion?

[Answer] This is not a case of what we or our Arab leaderships raise because the issue depends upon the stands of the international quarters and the U.S. stand which intransigently opposes all the Palestinian people's legitimate rights. Frankly, what is required from our Arab leaderships is not only to raise the minimum but also to raise the principles which the masses of the Arab nation aspire to achieve, principles which safeguard and insist on Palestinian rights and which are founded on the basis of recognition of the Palestinians' rights to self-determination and establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

[Question] How do you assess French-Palestinian relations following the Socialist Party's assumption of power?

[Answer] The French president made many promises when he was a presidential candidate. With his assumption of power, several steps emerged which were then considered prejudicial to Israel, such as the French stand on the Arab boycott

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

of Israel and the declaration that companies and plants which adhere to the boycott regulations will not be subsidized by the government. There was also Claude Cheysson's announcement on the PLO's representative status and that it is not the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Despite this, we look forward to a development of the French stand through the Socialist government. In the coming stage, we hope that the French stand will be more advanced than in the previous stages in order to clearly overcome all causes for hesitation toward the Palestinian right to self-determination and establishment of an independent state.

[Question] Do you still have hopes in the European initiative about which there has been a lot of talk?

[Answer] We believe that our move and political struggle make it incumbent upon us to be in constant contact with European quarters in order to develop their stands. The stand taken in Venice (the European summit conference) was a step forward, although it was followed by hesitant stands by some European circles in their contacts within the framework of the EEC.

[Question] Have you been informed that Khomeyni's Iran is dealing with Israel against the Arab country of Iraq?

[Answer] We in the Palestinian revolution have defined our stand on the Iraqi-Iranian war, hoping that it would end as soon as possible. We hoped that the bloodletting and the sapping of resources in the Iranian-Iraqi arena would end, for we consider that the Palestinian cause and the conflict with the Zionist enemy needs these squandered resources and potentials.

[Question] Facts, however, have dashed these hopes?

[Answer] This is our viewpoint. We need the Iranian revolution on the side of the Arab nation. The reality in Iraq and Iran is painful to the entire Arab nation. We are still hoping and talking to our brothers in Iraq and Iran. We are exerting all effort to stop this bloodletting. We are convinced that the battle with the Israeli enemy needs all efforts and from all directions.

COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI

CSO: 4404/56

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IRAQ

HAMMADI ATTACKS U.S. ROLE IN MIDEAST

PM061203 London THE TIMES in English 6 Oct 81 p 8

[Report by Richard Owen: "Iraqi Minister Attacks Arab States' Policies"]

[Text] Mr Sadun Hammadi, the Iraqi foreign minister, yesterday criticized moderate Arab states for pursuing pro-Western policies which he said were likely to cause internal unrest and thus create further instability in the region.

Speaking at the Royal Institute for International Affairs, Mr Hammadi singled out Egypt as a country whose leadership had created widespread discontent through its mistaken commitment to Camp David, but added that President al-Sadat was not alone among Arab leaders in tying himself to the West against the wishes of his people.

Mr Hammadi was especially critical of those Arab states which had strong links with the United States. Since the Reagan administration--"in so far as I can understand their policy"--had emphasized the need for a Western military presence in the Middle East while relegating the Arab-Israeli dispute and the Palestinian question to a secondary role. Iraq did not approve of Soviet attempts to dominate the region, but was equally opposed to American efforts.

The American idea of a "strategic consensus," he said, was built on a fallacy. Western leaders were wrong if they believed they could form alliances with both Israel and the Arab nations at the same time. He later clarified this to mean that if Western countries wanted to develop good relations with the Arabs, they would have to show readiness to make Israel "feel the pinch."

Mr Hammadi, who earlier paid a courtesy call on Mr Douglas Hurd, the minister of state at the Foreign Office, said West Europe should put pressure on both Israel and the United States to acknowledge the Arab viewpoint.

COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, [1981]

CSO: 4400/26

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

LIBYA

AL-TURAYKI DISCUSSES 6TH FLEET MOVEMENTS, MUBARAK

JN111423 London REUTER in English 1022 GMT 11 Oct 81

[Text] Damascus, 11 Oct (REUTER)--Libyan Foreign Secretary (Minister) 'Ali 'Abd al-Salam al-Turayki has said U.S. Sixth Fleet movements in the Mediterranean will only make the Arabs more determined to foil the U.S.-sponsored Camp David peace accords between Israel and Egypt.

Dr. al-Turayki told reporters after meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam and Palestinian leader Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) here yesterday that the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat should be a "lesson to American imperialism."

(The official Libyan news Agency JANA, monitored in Beirut, said today had been declared a holiday in Libya to enable citizens to express their joy at the death of President al-Sadat.)

Dr al-Turayki, who arrived in Syria yesterday, went to the Mediterranean city of Latakia today to deliver a message from Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi to President Hafiz al-Asad on developments in the Arab world.

He said his talks with Mr Khaddam and Abu Iyad concentrated on the "importance of the Arab role in strengthening the struggle to remove the traces of Camp David."

Syria, Libya, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Algeria and South Yemen are members of the steadfastness and confrontation front, which is strongly opposed to the Camp David agreements between Egypt and Israel.

Dr al-Turayki said Husni Mubarak, who has been nominated to succeed President al-Sadat, was "apparently trying from the beginning of the road to be an extension to al-Sadat's trend."

CSO: 4500/21

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

LIBYA

AL-QADHDHAFI WELCOMES AFGHAN OFFICIAL

PM011345 London THE GUARDIAN in English 1 Sep 81 p 4

[Dispatch by Martin Walker: "Afghan Minister Is Welcomed by Libya"]

[Text] Tripoli--Colonel al-Qadhdhafi has cleared the final hurdle which separated him from the Soviet block--his opposition to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan--by welcoming an official representative of the Kabul government to Libya's 12th anniversary festivities in Tripoli this week.

Mr Sullmar Laygig, a member of the Afghan Revolutionary Comman Council and minister of tribal affairs, was welcomed to Tripoli and made a formal statement of praise.

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's welcome to the Afghan minister reverses the stand that Libya had maintained against the Soviet presence in that country. On his state visit to Russia earlier this year, Colonel al-Qadhdhafi had embarrassed his hosts by criticising yet again their military intervention in a Muslim country. That visit, which had been expected to lead to an invitation to Russia to arrange a regular naval presence in Libyan ports, was seen as something of a failure because of Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's stand on Afghanistan. The Soviet Union has since made an effort to mollify the Libyans by deploying diplomats and officials from their own Muslim republics. Mr Arstanbek Duysheyev, the president of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic, and vice-chairman of the Soviet Presidium, has been one of the Soviet officials who has helped to persuade Colonel al-Qadhdhafi that Moscow should not be seen as an enemy of Islam. Mr Duysheyev is also now in Tripoli for this week's celebrations.

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's acceptance of the Soviet-backed Afghan regime follows last week's friendship treaty between Libya and the pro-Soviet states of Ethiopia and South Yemen. The communique of that treaty made no criticism of the Russian presence in Afghanistan, hailed the socialist block for "their support of liberation struggles around the world," and condemned "the forces of imperialism and reaction" for meddling in Afghan affairs.

Libyan officials yesterday refused to comment on suggestions that the visit of the Afghan leader had been arranged only at the last minute. But diplomatic observers in Tripoli saw it as yet another sign of the change in Libyan foreign policy that the confrontation with the U.S. 6th Fleet in the Gulf of Sirte has inspired.

COPYRIGHT: Guardian Newspapers, Limited, 1 September 1981

CSO: 4500/21

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ONLY

MOROCCO

ARREST OF PREVIOUSLY IMMUNE BOUABID DISCUSSED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1081, 23 Sep 81 pp 18-21

[Article by Hamid Barrada: "Why King Hassan II Arrested Bouabid"]

[Text] In one of the most stirring episodes of the Algerian war, Jean-Paul Sartre openly defied government authority. Certain aides to the president of the French Republic, arguing that the law was equal for everyone, suggested indicting the philosopher, but De Gaulle settled the matter in his sovereign manner: "One does not arrest Voltaire!"

A comparison is not justification. Abderrahim Bouabid is not Jean-Paul Sartre. King Hassan II is not De Gaulle. And yet, between the first secretary of the USFP (Socialist Union of Popular Forces) and the Moroccan monarch, there have always existed relations governed by an unwritten law but one that was perfectly verifiable, according to which the leader of the opposition enjoyed absolute immunity. At one time or another, the leaders of his party of any importance have all tasted prison or been forced to go into exile, when they were not assassinated. He remained untouched.

On 16 July 1963, after one of the many conspiracies that made the headlines, the Oufkir police proceeded to arrest all the leaders of the UNFP [National Union of Popular Forces] (now the USFP) when they were at a meeting. Bouabid was with them, but he was immediately released as soon as the king learned of the "mistake." Hassan II had been inspired, for less than 2 years later, in March 1965, the Casablanca riots broke out and the monarch found an interlocutor to help him out of a bad spot: Abderrahim Bouabid. With a few variations, the same scenario has been repeated throughout the entire tormented history of independent Morocco.

This mutual understanding cannot be explained by some unswerving friendship between the chief of state and the leader of the opposition. The two men have fought one another relentlessly, to such a point that political life has often taken on the aspect of a singular duel between them. But it is as if whatever the cost, each one were scrupulously careful not to go beyond certain limits. The moderation of one would be answered by the proper measure of the other. Everything separates the socialist from the monarch, but they have the same sense of government.

Historians may one day say what the unsteady Moroccan democracy owes to what must be called the conflictive alliance between Hassan II and Abderrahim Bouabid.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Observers may henceforth affirm that with the arrest of the leader of the opposition, an era has come to an end. What happened to cause the king to break with a deeply rooted tradition and order the questioning, then the charging, of Abderrahim Bouabid? What are the consequences of the apparently incomprehensible decision?

The very conditions of the arrest of the leader of the opposition are rather surprising. Obviously, it was decided no longer to spare a man who enjoyed the affection of Mohammed V and who receives a certain amount of consideration abroad as well as in the interior of the country.

At 2230 hours on Tuesday, 8 September, they rang the doorbell at his comfortable (not luxurious) home in the Agdal district of Rabat. The unknown caller refused to reveal his identity but demanded to speak with "Si Abderrahim." Bouabid finally went to the door himself. He found himself facing three strapping men who said they were from the police and asked him to go with them. Without further details or any arrest warrant, Bouabid refused to obey. They knocked him about, tried to put handcuffs on him and finally overcame his resistance. However, they did not take him away by force.

Najat, Bouabid's wife, telephoned friends to warn them in the meantime and bothersome witnesses rapidly gathered before the house on Rue Michlifane. The family continued to telephone. At one time, the operator came on the line: "Please hang up; the minister of interior wants to speak with Si Abderrahim." Driss Basri was soon on the other end of the line, but the three policemen prevented Bouabid from speaking with the all-powerful minister. One of them, wearing an overcoat, went into the living room to take the phone and was heard to say: "I am Merzak, from the RG [expansion unknown]. We have orders not to let him go back home."

Bouabid still refused to get in one of the four Simca 1000's parked near his home. He would only leave in the official red and white van of the National Police. It was 2345 hours. The police did not oppose his being accompanied by Mohamed Farouki. The request was not without misunderstandings: They had confused the lawyer, who is not unknown, with Mohamed Forkani, member of the Political Bureau of the USFP. It was not until 0330 hours that they would admit their error and free Farouki.

Abderrahim Bouabid's questioning began immediately after his arrival at the Central Police Station. The subject of the crime was a communique from his party's Political Bureau. The party had been meeting since 1 September to study the proposed referendum in the Sahara decided upon by the OAU in Nairobi on 24 and 25 August and accepted by the king of Morocco (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1079). On Tuesday, 7 September, the USFP was planning to release a text in which it considered that the Nairobi II resolutions, contrary to the official position, risked leading to the abandonment of the Sahara. It recommended, in order to meet "the grave and real perils threatening the territorial integrity of our country," a "democratic, popular referendum, in keeping with the constitution."

In sum, the USFP wanted a referendum in all of Morocco on the timeliness of a referendum in the Sahara. It was this position that provoked the curiosity of the police. The leader of the opposition told them this in substance: "We believe that the decisions made at Nairobi II go against the interests of Morocco. We hope we are mistaken, but when dangers threaten a nation, it is better to be

mistaken than to remain silent." His "interlocutors" had concerns that were not so lofty, of the "Who wrote the text, who typed it?" sort. "As first secretary, I am responsible for everything," the prisoner stated.

At about 0530 hours, Bouabid was taken to USFP headquarters to verify that the text in question was indeed being printed and stored there. An hour later, the police would return alone to seize typewriters, mimeograph machines and other copiers.

In the afternoon, the first secretary of the USFP was notified that he was being charged with violating the government's foreign security (Article 188 of the Penal Code). He risked a prison term of 5 to 30 years in wartime, 1 to 5 years in peacetime. Less than 24 hours after his questioning (at precisely 1700 hours on Wednesday, 9 September), Abderrahim Bouabid was consigned to El-Laalou Prison.

At the same time, Mohamed Mansour, also a member of the Political Bureau of the USFP and one of the most prestigious figures of the resistance under the Protectorate, was arrested in Casablanca. The other party leaders were actively sought. Mohamed Forkani -- the real one -- was arrested. Mohamed Lyazghi and Mohamed Aziz Lahbabi could not be found. On Thursday, 10 September, they went to the police of their own accord. This did not stop the search because expert sleuths would try to put their hands on them by searching Bouabid's home.

Two days after the questioning of the leader of the opposition, all his colleagues in the Political Bureau still in Morocco (Abderrahmane Youssoufi, Moulay Mehdi Alaoui and Dr Abdellatif Benjelloun were abroad) were therefore under lock and key. By 1000 hours on Friday, 11 September, they were to be tried according to the flagrante delicto procedure.

The trial did not immediately go well for the accusers. The court, made up of young judges, was in a tight corner before the black wave of the defense. Some 200 lawyers from the four corners of the country had donned their robes! In a dramatic move, the prosecutor announced that he would not apply Article 188 (violation of foreign security). Only the dahir of 29 June 1935 (see below) would be invoked. Consequently, the accused risked no more than 3 months to 2 years in prison.

The defense refused to bring up procedural questions. "When Abderrahim Bouabid is in the dock, the form becomes absurd," remarked Seddiki, aide to the leader of the opposition and president of the barristers of Rabat. At the outset, they had not even taken the trouble to ask for the lifting of parliamentary immunity for deputies Lyazghi and Mansour. Another dramatic move: The court decided to "delay the trial for two weeks to study the file." The defense retained its advantage: "We could demand provisional freedom for our clients, but with their approval, we abstain!"

In this test of force, it was without a doubt the opposition that won the first heat. Bouabid had constantly been depressed in recent months and had even "gotten old" (he was only 61). According to all witnesses, he was in top form after his arrest: "That is the best thing that could have happened to him!" his close friends affectionately said. Referring to the adjoining cells where he was held with his four comrades, he quipped: "They reserved a suite for us!"

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

This man, who has remained faithful to his humble origins, only seems to be at ease in adversity. The definite idea he has of his worth, combined with a certain idea he has of Morocco, clashes with the role of eternal opponent in which the Palace has managed to confine him. For over 20 years, heading a left whose generous fights vie with adventurous wanderings, he has repeatedly repaired the mistakes of his friends, limited the damage done to his party. He has never been paid back.

In fact, the entire USFP has paradoxically regained its freedom of movement since it has again experienced prison, for both good and bad reasons. This party, rooted in the armed struggle against the Protectorate, is more suited to heroism and martyrdom than to the patient work of education and organization required by its sociodemocratic choices. It is not any accident that the slogan that most frequently emerges from its depths is an appeal for "perseverance" (Samidoun-Samidoun). It should be noted that the practices of the government -- as attested to by the blind repression of the June riots in Casablanca as well as the circumstances surrounding Bouabid's arrest -- do not facilitate the reconversion of minds to democratic legality.

The recent evolution of the Sahara question has not brought the government closer to the opposition. If one carefully reads the USFP communique on Nairobi II, one notes that the leaders of the party wonder, with sincerity if not with anguish, whether King Hassan II has not made concessions that carry him too far, if, very specifically, the country is not going to lose its Sahara after the heavy sacrifices it has made to get it back.

Actually, if it abides scrupulously by the OAU decisions and the known or foreseeable intentions of the antagonists, it is to be feared that the referendum may lead to the secession of part of the territory heretofore considered as the nation's. At any rate, it is the first time, to our knowledge, that the results of a vote linked to the history of decolonization has been ignored. Nairobi succeeded in the eyes of the OAU because its decisions are black and white. Either the glass is half empty or half full.

As Hassan II does, one may also emphasize the real advantages for his country (maintenance of the Moroccan administration and army over the disputed territory, for example) or join with the USFP in emphasizing the equally real disadvantages (such as the interim administration or the principle of allowing refugees from neighboring countries to participate in the voting). One may bet that Hassan II, whose savoir-faire no longer has to be demonstrated, will finally win out and keep the Sahara, but it is also permissible to speculate on the opposite possibility. It is a matter of faith or opinions.

But why do differences of opinion on the question of the Sahara, which divides the political class and which is not a recent one -- for example, the opposition had recommended breaking with Algeria since 1975, while the king systematically, and courageously, took it upon himself to avoid the irreparable -- suddenly give rise to a bitter confrontation? Why has the famous sacred union collapsed like a castle of sand?

The answer is quite simply because more than the Sahara and Morocco is involved. In other words, if it dealt with the regions of the south colonized by Spain, the sacred union has not, strictly speaking, gone beyond that very limited domain. And in the long run, it resulted artificial, especially since with the extension of the Saharan conflict (it has lasted 6 years), problems such as the high cost of living became more important, in the eyes of the poor.

Under such conditions, the socialist opposition, whose popular following remains real, could not, unless it contradicted itself, remain insensitive to the concerns of the majority of the people. Convinced in all good faith that Moroccan diplomacy committed an error in putting its finger into the spokes of the OAU, having nothing more to expect from a partner that gives it a figurehead role in the institutions, and fearing it was witnessing the last days of the policy of liberalization, the USFP was quite naturally willing to seize the first opportunity to embarrass the government. Nairobi II provided it with that opportunity. It was a good tactic. That was all the government needed to initiate hostilities, for Abderrahim Bouabid's arrest has no other meaning.

How far will they be pushed? In our opinion, not too far. "This regime neither cuts off heads nor settles problems," it has judiciously been said of the Moroccan monarchy. It should be added that despite the new determination it now shows, the socialist opposition also shares this peaceful -- and reassuring -- nonchalance. Are democracies not built on imperturbability and tolerance?

One does not arrest Voltaire! But if one does arrest him, one can fairly well release him!

"Whosoever Law"

The Dahir of 29 June 1935 by virtue of which Abderrahim Bouabid and his comrades are being tried is very "popular" in Morocco. It is commonly known as the "whosoever law" because of the indefinite pronoun that punctuates the text. It was imposed on Mohamed V by the colonial authorities and its abrogation has been futilely demanded since independence.

The official translation reads: "In all countries, the concern for maintaining public order, more essential than ever to restoring the economic situation, justifies new measures aimed at affirming trust. For some time, the French Government has taken timely measures in the possessions or colonies directly under its authority.

"Our Majesty, concerned for maintaining order, tranquillity and security in his empire, in trusting cooperation with the protective nation, has deemed that these new requirements had to be accompanied by appropriate legislation. This dahir is for that purpose.

"Article: Whosoever, in any place and by any means, provokes active or passive resistance to application of the laws, decrees, regulations or orders from the public authority;

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"Whosoever incites to disorders or manifestations or provokes them;

"Whosoever engages in an action aimed at disturbing order, tranquillity and security will be subject to imprisonment for 3 months to 2 years and a fine of 500 to 2,000 francs, or only one of these two penalties. The penalty of local banishment may also be pronounced."

COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981

11,464
CS0: 4519/3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SAUDI ARABIA

FOREIGN MINISTER URGES U.S.-PLO CONTACTS

JN181322 London REUTER in English 1247 GMT 18 Sep 81

[Report by Paul Eedle]

[Text] Bahrain, 18 Sep (REUTER)--Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal urged the United States today to establish contacts with the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as an essential move towards Middle East peace.

In a telexed reply to questions from REUTERS, he also said contacts between the U.S. and the PLO already had achieved results in South Lebanon last July, ending 2 weeks of increasingly bitter fighting between Israelis and Palestinian guerrillas.

Prince Sa'ud made the statement as Crown Prince Fahd was due in London in the latest stage of a major Saudi initiative to end the decades-old Arab-Israeli conflict.

He added: "The ceasefire in southern Lebanon was successful because it was worked out between the parties directly involved, i.e. the PLO and Israel, through the valuable mediation of the United States.

"We believe that this method should be repeated in the discussions aiming at a just and durable peace in the region. Anyway, this is the only realistic approach to solve this problem."

A senior U.S. official said last July the U.S. was trying to develop the shaky ceasefire into a broader peace settlement.

The Saudi foreign minister stated today: Peace in the Middle East can only be achieved through the full and equal participation of the PLO in all the discussions aiming at the solution of the Middle East and Palestine problems.

"United States recognition of this fact is absolutely essential, and we hope the U.S. Government will realise this and begin establishing contacts with the PLO leadership."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Saudi Arabia launched its peace initiative last month when Prince Fahd called on the U.S. to recognise the PLO. He also listed eight principles for a Middle East settlement, including the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital and the right of all countries in the region to live in peace.

In addition to Prince Fahd's talks in Europe--he already has seen French President Francois Mitterrand--Saudi Arabia is looking to the United Nations and the next Arab summit, probably in Morocco next November, for support for its initiative.

Prince Sa'ud said today his country wanted Prince Fahd's eight principles to be the "basis and framework of a single resolution to be adopted and implemented by the United Nations and especially the permanent members of the Security Council."

Saudi Arabia's five partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council--Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Oman and Bahrain--agreed earlier this month to try to rally other Arabs behind the plan at the forthcoming summit.

The public has been given few details of Prince Fahd's talks, which included conversations with U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig.

CSO: 4400/26

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SAUDI ARABIA

YAMANI LAUNCHES NEW U.K. MAGAZINE

PM021129 London THE TIMES in English 1 Oct 81 p 14

[Report by Michael Horsnell under the general headline "The Times Diary": "With a Little Help From Shaykh Yamani"]

[Text] A white rolls-royce and a fleet of Saudi Arabian Embassy cadillacs outside the Cafe Royal did not exactly keep secret the arrival of the Saudi Oil Minister Shaykh Yamani yesterday.

In the empire room, with a bust of Napoleon in the background, Yamani held court; not to warn of dreadful news at the petrol pumps but to confirm himself in the unfamiliar role of magazine columnist. The affable Yamani was bestowing a favour on his old friends Muhammad Salah ad-Din and Muhammad ibn 'Ali al-Wazir by gracing the launch of their new monthly glossy publication ARABIA, THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW. He has written weighty pieces for the first two editions, which have already been printed. The launch was delayed because of the logistical problems of getting globetrotting Saudi princes and eminent Islamic academics together as speakers. In the event, the floor was awash with eminent Moslem scholars whose general theme seemed to be to berate the West for the failures of its systems and values.

Yamani, of course, has no intention of taking up journalism as a fulltime career but he did tell me the magazine had been established to inform the West about developments in Islam. Later the oil minister, the soul of courtesy, put me right on my well-meaning suggestion that he had helped finance the venture--he has not.

For those too impatient to obtain copies of ARABIA, I can reveal that Yamani's articles are on the supply and demand of crude oil, and the affinities and differences between Islam and Christianity. Though I fear the market for English-language, Middle East orientated magazines in London may well be saturated, I am sure the publication will not lack for finance or, indeed, continuity.

COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, [1981]

CSO: 4400/26

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SUDAN

ALIER COMMENTS ON WESTERN ROLE IN AFRICA

PM140820 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 5 Sep 81 p 11

[Undated interview with Sudanese Second Vice President Abel Alier by Dino Frescobaldi: "What To Do To Counter 'al-Qadhdhafi Storm'"]

[Excerpt] Rome--"By sending his troops to Chad," Abel Alier said, "al-Qadhdhafi not only violated the principle of noninterference in other countries' internal affairs, which lies at the root of the OAU charter. Are there conflicts in Chad? Then they should be resolved by the people concerned, that is, by the country's own inhabitants. The mere fact that Libyan forces are on our borders constitutes improper interference and pressure. The Libyans are not in a position to invade Sudan and we are capable of defending ourselves, but we see a grave threat in Tripoli's behavior. Furthermore, we know that other African governments are of the same opinion."

As far as the Sudanese second vice president is concerned, however, the al-Qadhdhafi issue is only one aspect of Africa's troubled existence. Above all, al-Qadhdhafi must not constitute an excuse for the guilty conscience of the West, particularly Europe. "Let us take the Namibian problem," Abel Alier said: "South Africa not only refuses to grant the country independence, ignoring the peoples' right and appeals from throughout the world, but even invades Angola. Nevertheless, the United States refuses to condemn it, thus helping to discredit the security council and facilitating Soviet policy in Africa. It is difficult for Africans to understand such behavior. We say to the Europeans: You are worried about Soviet penetration into Africa; well, start by using all the means available to you and all your prestige to ensure recognition of the Namibian people's right to self-determination. If Namibia is independent and if Angola no longer feels threatened, the Soviet Union and Cuba will have no further reason to run to their aid."

[Question] But there are other conflicts in Africa, after all. In particular, how do you view the recent agreement among Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen, which threatens to split Africa even more into rival camps and which seems to grip Sudan in a vise?

[Answer] Sudan has and intends to maintain good-neighborly relations with Ethiopia. We make no pronouncements about Ethiopia's internal system. We do know, however, that the Ethiopian people are very proud of their independence.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

We, therefore, believe that, once the problems of Eritrea and of relations with Somalia have been resolved, they will be very pleased to free themselves of any forms of interference.

You would like to know whether there is a solution to the Eritrean problem and to the problem of Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. I do not want to go into detail, partly to avoid interfering, but I must not omit to point out that Sudan resolved its domestic problems years ago through debate and the peaceful approach. We are convinced that if this method is encouraged by those in authority--I am referring to Europe and particularly to your country--the problems of the Horn of Africa can be resolved. Thus the reasons for the Soviet presence in the area will disappear. Roughly the same can be said about the other African conflict, in the Western Sahara.

[Question] Can al-Qadhdhafi's destabilizing activity be stopped? How can Moscow be prevented from continuing to "fish in troubled waters" and to take advantage of African rivalries?

[Answer] There is only one piece of advice that I can give to Europe: Help the African societies to free themselves from their most serious ills--poverty and famine.

COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.

CSO: 4528/2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SUDAN

ENVOY TO CAIRO COMMENTS ON U.S. ARMS DECISION

PM131453 London THE TIMES in English 13 Oct 81 p 6

[Dispatch by Christopher Walker: "Khartoum Hails Arms Deal and Alignment With U.S."]

[Text] Cairo, 12 Oct--The Sudanese Government today expressed satisfaction at America's decision to pump extra arms and money into the impoverished country of 18 million people which seems destined to become the latest focal point for superpower rivalry in Africa.

In an interview with THE TIMES, Mr Ghasim Idris, first secretary of Sudan's Embassy in Cairo said: "The arms are intended to defend our country against the Libyans. Our relations with America are now getting very steady and we have no reservations about the development. My government believes that the Soviet Union is trying to get a foothold in the area."

Mr Idris confirmed that a top-level team of American advisers had been dispatched to Khartoum to negotiate the urgent delivery of American arms designed to help the government of President Numayri to combat increasing Libyan bombing raids from Chad into western Sudan.

It is understood that the arms package will include tanks, aircraft and possibly a ground-to-air missile system. The Sudanese have been lobbying strongly for such weapons if Libyan aggression is to be countered.

The latest raid took place last Thursday, the first day of the Muslim feast of the sacrifice and resulted in a number of casualties when two villages were bombed.

Some foreign observers believe that President Numayri is taking a considerable risk in allying himself so closely with the American concept of security in the Middle East.

An immediate result is certain to be further isolation in the Arab world and opposition in Sudan where the traditional hostility between the north and south of the country has been exacerbated by the discovery of oil.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Like the late President al-Sadat President Numayri has come under increasing internal pressure from Islamic opposition groups, and concern in Washington about the stability of the government is one reason why the United States has been so quick to respond.

While al-Sadat arrested about 16,000 of his countrymen last month in a purge of religious and political opponents, a little earlier President Numayri ordered the arrest of about 10,000 Sudanese.

President Numayri's internal difficulties have been increased by the country's acute financial situation, with estimates of its short-term financial needs of anything up to 1,000m pounds. The Reagan administration has pledged \$200m (111m pounds) for the next financial year, half of which is earmarked for military sales.

European observers interpret the American decision to provide such immediate and visible support to Sudan as the latest manifestation of the domino theory so familiar at the time of the Vietnam War. The Reagan administration is known to be nervous that any overthrow in Khartoum could indirectly threaten both Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

The Libyan threat to Sudan was the dominant subject of the private talks held here earlier this week between President Numayri and Mr Alexander Haig, the American secretary of state.

COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1981

CSO: 4500/21

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SUDAN

NUMAYRI URGES U.S., EEC TO BOYCOTT LIBYAN OIL

PM141345 London THE TIMES in English 14 Oct 81 pp 1, 8

[Interview with Sudanese President Numayri by Christopher Walker: "Sudanese Leader Calls for Libya Oil Boycott"]

[Text] Cairo, 13 Oct--President Numayri of Sudan tonight called on the United States and the European Community to impose a temporary boycott on Libyan oil imports to sabotage Colonel al-Qadhafi's subversion in the Middle East and Africa.

In an interview with THE TIMES the Sudanese leader claimed that Libya's economy was now heavily dependent on oil revenues. "If for two or three months Europe and America stopped buying any oil from al-Qadhafi (the Libyan leader) it would cause chaos for him," he said.

"This will give him a good lesson not to act uncivilizedly against Africa, the Arab world and the world at large," he said.

One third of Libya's oil goes to the United States, accounting for three per cent of America's oil imports.

Speaking at the luxurious palace in Cairo where he has been staying since his arrival to attend the al-Sadat funeral, Mr Numayri described Libya's leader as "an unpredictable madman" dedicated to the overthrow of the regimes in Sudan and Egypt.

Hours before the interview, two bombs exploded at Cairo airport in luggage from an aircraft which had come from Tripoli.

For the first time since the latest superpower crisis in the Middle East erupted, Mr Numayri predicted that war between Sudan and Libya was "inevitable" unless Colonel al-Qadhafi was overthrown.

"If he remains as head of state, the war cannot be avoided," the president told me. "He has been working for it for several years. He thinks he cannot lead the Arab world and Africa unless he puts his hands on both Sudan and Egypt."

Mr Numayri also appealed to the European Community Countries--particularly Britain, France and West Germany--to follow America's recent example and provide Sudan with urgent military aid. He disclosed that a number of diplomatic feelers had already been put out in Europe.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Mr Numayri said that extra air defences for Sudan were vital in the light of Libyan plans to bomb the Gezira dam across the Blue Nile, which is vital for the irrigation of a large populated sector of Sudan.

"We have seen two strategic Russian-made bombers on the airstrips which he has built in Chad and we are expecting them to bomb us at any moment if the Chadian guerrillas put pressure on him."

Looking fit, despite a recent punishing schedule of diplomatic meetings in Cairo, Mr Numayri was speaking shortly after voting personally in the Egyptian referendum to confirm Mr Husni Mubarak as the next president.

His gesture of solidarity for Mr Mubarak--whom he has known personally since 1954--was made under recent dual nationality legislation between the countries.

Tomorrow Mr Numayri will address the Egyptian People's Assembly in an effort to reinforce close ties between Sudan and Egypt in the wake of al-Sadat's assassination. "I will ask the people to stand behind Husni Mubarak," he explained.

Mr Numayri claimed that Sudanese intelligence had recently uncovered evidence that Libya had set up 26 training camps inside the country to train guerrillas of different nationalities to wage terrorist campaigns abroad. He said that one of these was being used to train members of the IRA.

"I am trying to carry the war inside Libya, it is a kind of active defence," he added. "If I find the camps, I am going to use some of the thousands of Sudanese workers inside Libya against them."

Mr Numayri who at the age of 51 has survived more than half a dozen attempted plots--claimed that 7,000 Sudanese workers had been imprisoned in Libya because of their refusal to be recruited to the war of subversion against Sudan.

The president spoke enthusiastically about the results of his talks in Cairo last Sunday with Mr Alexander Haig, the United States secretary of state. He said he had been assured that \$130m (72m pounds) of promised military aid would now be provided in the next few months.

The package would include four F5 interceptor jet aircraft to be used against Libya in Western Sudan. In recent days Libyan aircraft had strafed two villages in the area and more attacks were now expected.

COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1981

CSO: 4500/21

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

WAR SEEN BRINGING REGIME TO VERGE OF COLLAPSE

LD060910 London THE SUNDAY TIMES in English 6 Sep 81 p 6

[Report by James Adams from San'a': "Soviet Aid to Rebels Threatens Collapse in N. Yemen"--London THE SUNDAY TIMES headline]

[Text] Hill 2430, surrounded by the lush farmland of the Wadi Bana in the heart of the North Yemen mountains is normally a tranquil place caressed by hot breezes and echoing to the cries of boys tending their goats. But times are far from normal and tranquility has long since been blasted from the hill--some 125 miles south of San'a'--by the angry chatter of kalashnikov automatic rifles and the crump of mortars.

For the past 2 months, 100 men of North Yemen's 8th commando brigade have clung defiantly to a small ridge of the hill. Below and all around Hill 2430 the guns of the National Democratic Front guerrillas have maintained relentless fire.

The guerrillas dominate the southern region of North Yemen. Localised clashes have flared into a full-scale civil war. In recent weeks, three battles have been fought between the government and the Front, with several hundred men from both sides killed.

What makes these battles very different from the tribal clashes that have always plagued the country is that Russia and Libya are financing the Front. The conflict has prompted widespread alarm in Salih's government and throughout the West.

"If the Russians can secure control of the Red Sea and access to Saudi Arabia through North Yemen, they are going to be in a very strong position indeed," said one Western diplomat.

Libya's involvement in a revolutionary war in the Gulf has come as a surprise. Since 1979, Colonel al-Qadhdhafi has had little to do with rebel groups in the region. Yet Libya is pouring in funds at the rate of 500,000 pounds a month as well as supplying all the arms to the Front.

Meanwhile, the Aden summit is seen as evidence of stronger political and financial support for the Front from Libya, Ethiopia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (the leftist regime in Britain's former Aden colony).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

But there are few signs of the West rushing to Salih's aid. The U.S. has just increased its cash grant to his country from \$750,000 to \$16,500,000, although most of that will finance civil programmes rather than war.

It appears to be Salih's legendary short-term expediency that has left him without an ally in his greatest hour of need. The Americans are still smarting from the time they supplied Salih with \$500 million of arms in 1979, only to see him go straight to Moscow and ask for a similar amount from the Russians.

"He is seeing the long-term consequences of his actions," said one American. Salih has fallen out of favour in Saudi Arabia, too. The Saudis, angry at his courtship with Russia, are fusing further financial aid. Russia also appears to be getting tough with him--demanding repayment of a 350 million pounds arms debt which he has no hope of paying.

For centuries North Yemen's borders to the north and east running through the vast unmapped sand deserts of the empty quarter have provided smuggling routes into Saudi Arabia. Those routes could easily be turned into channels for political infiltration should an unfriendly government take power in San'a'.

The Saudis, who have always been conscious of the dangers, have regularly contributed to the Yemeni economy--50 million pounds, for example, of last year's annual budget of 750 million pounds. But this has made little impact in a country where the people spend more on qat, the local narcotic leaf chewed by everyone from the president to the local housewife, than the entire national budget.

But economic chaos and excessive qat-chewing are the least of the problems facing Salih, and his downfall looks imminent, with tribal support fading and the rebel forces of the front making sweeping gains. The Front, comprising Nasserites, Syria Ba'thists, Marxists, socialists and supporters of al-Qadhdhafi, originally tried to get Salih to give it some ministerial posts. Last year, having failed in this, it took up arms against him.

With around 8,000 men under arms, the Front equals the fighting strength of the Yemeni Army. The rebels fight in the areas surrounding T'aizz, where mountains, some as high as 12,000 ft, are a maze of narrow defiles and deep wadis--ideal for guerrilla ambushes.

The Front is also very active politically and in the occupied areas has set up schools, clinics and agricultural centres. All this supports their propaganda that it is the government, who are from the Zaidi tribal group who have neglected the southern Shaifis. Such propaganda is particularly worrying to other Gulf countries who all have similar potential problems. In Saudi Arabia, for example, a Sunni minority rule over a Shi'a majority and there are fears that the lessons learned in the revolutionary campaign in North Yemen could prove explosive.

COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1981

CSO: 4400/26

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

INTERVIEW WITH PREMIER DR 'ABD AL-KARIM AL-IRYAN

JN121144 Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 9 Oct 81 p 47

[Interview with YAR Premier Dr 'Abd al-Karim al-Iryani by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI San'a' correspondent Ahmad Hafiz--date not given]

[Text] [Question] Many political observers differ on the Yemeni political trends on the domestic and foreign levels at the present time, foremost of which are the trends of the open-door policy to all kinds of assistance from the East and the West. Do you believe that this open-door policy might influence the independence of the Yemeni national decision in the near future?

[Answer] I categorically do not believe this. We are an independent and sovereign state governed by a national regime which stems from Yemen's heritage and works for it. Our openness toward the various countries does not mean that we are relinquishing our country's independence. We have not given any country, which is providing us with assistance, any privileges on our territories. There are no military bases or facilities. Also we have not joined any regional or international alliances or pacts. Let me reassure you, however, that despite all this, our country has solid relations of friendship with all. These relations are based on mutual interests and benefits, especially since the ideology of the current political leadership stems from pan-Arab and Islamic concepts and since our policy and relations with the Arab countries are based on the acceptance of the principle of plurality of ideologies in the Arab world even though we do not share the same opinions as some of our Arab brothers. As you see, we have good relations with all Arab countries. An example of this is that when the Arab justice ministers conference recently convened in San'a', all the Arab ministers attended and participated in this conference. Do you not agree with me that this is a unique thing rarely seen in the various Arab conferences which are held at all levels?

[Question] Do you not think that intensive foreign presence on Yemeni territory, represented in the various projects, calls for wonder?

[Answer] This calls for appreciation and admiration, and the countries which came to Yemen to offer their assistance and to contribute in bringing the country out of its backwardness must be thanked. Yemen is a poor country in resources and is in need of every assistance to compensate for its many centuries of backwardness. To achieve development and remedy all the harm done during the imamate rule, we found that the best solution was to adopt an open-door policy toward

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

all countries while safeguarding the independence of the political decision in our country. This trend also stems from a basic principle of the Yemeni policy; that of positive neutrality toward this openness which you find over all Yemeni territory.

[Question] What do you mean by this?

[Answer] To explain what I mean, let me give you these examples concerning the projects that were implemented with foreign assistance. The construction of San'a' airport was started by the Soviets and was completed by the West Germans. The Ta'izz-San'a' road was implemented by the Soviets. The al-Mafraq-Ta'izz road was started by the Americans and completed by the Kuwaiti Development Fund. The Jaidah-Jizayn road is fully financed by Saudi Arabia. There are also many other big projects in which many countries of the world have participated.

Dr al-Iryani adds laughing: I do not exaggerate when I say that Yemen represents a United Nations in the field of development and I believe that the Yemeni experiment in this field is unique among the developing countries.

[Question] Do you not believe that the time will come when every country will ask for the price of its assistance to Yemen?

[Answer] I do not believe that this will happen. Those countries which helped us know that we are a poor country that needs assistance. The principle of assistance is acknowledged in the world at large. In any case, let me reiterate that Yemen is capable of protecting its interests and soil against any foreign interference at any time.

[Question] You are the only country in the Arabian peninsula that has not joined the Gulf Cooperation Council and the alliance among Aden, Ethiopia and Libya. What are the causes for this Yemeni phenomenon and can it be explained by specific objectives?

[Answer] First of all, here in Yemen, we reiterate the Arab countries right to operate within the framework of the Arab League. The Gulf Cooperation Council is an experiment which is taking place within this framework. Therefore, we have no objections to it. The Arab League charter stipulates that any Arab country has the right to achieve unity or federation with another Arab country. Because we are committed to this charter, we bless the establishment of any kind of unity between two Arab countries. President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih was the first Arab president to send a cable of congratulations to Syrian and Libyan presidents when they proclaimed unity between their two countries.

[Question] Are you not afraid of some kind of "isolation" in facing specific alliances?

[Answer] We do not believe that any regional alliance will have an influence on our independent and neutral trend.

[Question] It has been said that you sought to join the Gulf Cooperation Council more than once but that these efforts were not successful?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Answer] Everything that has been said on the subject has merely been rumors disseminated by the press and are groundless.

[Question] Why do you not join the Gulf Cooperation Council?

[Answer] Why should we join? Our relations with all the Gulf Council members are good and the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council has in no way affected these brotherly relations. These relations are at the highest level and we are fully satisfied with them. What interests us is the core and not the form. I mean the form of the relations whether they are in the form of a federation, a council or....

[Question] Did Lt Gen Abu Bakr Yunis' visit to San'a' and his attending the 26 September revolution anniversary celebrations contribute to restoring relations between Libya and Yemen to their normal state?

[Answer] We were not the ones who began attacking Libya, its president or its policy as Colonel al-Qadhdhafi has done in his speech at (ad-Dali') when he attacked us. This caused some confusion among us. Let me, however, reiterate that in the wake of the contacts that took place between the two fraternal countries, these differences were eliminated and we considered Abu Bakr Yunis' attendance at the conference a closed subject. We do not seek disputes with any Arab or foreign country.

[Question] Did you discuss the issue of financial assistance to Yemen with the Libyan envoy or did he propose any such assistance?

[Answer] Sir, had he come to San'a' to offer assistance, he would not have come to San'a' in the first place.

[Question] Many questions are being raised on the expected unity between the two parts of the one Yemen, the most prominent being: How can unity be established between two countries whose political, social and economic regimes are diametrically opposite to each other?

[Answer] This is an important question. While I understand the motives for this question, I must stress a very important point. This point is that what is common between the two countries is far more than what separates them. We are one people and have one land and one civilization. These facts will eliminate all other obstacles. The incentive for unity between our people is stronger than any other consideration. Therefore, any political leadership, whether in North or South Yemen, cannot ignore these Yemeni feelings and the deep-rooted desire that exists in the heart of every Yemeni citizen.

[Question] Why then this delay in achieving this great objective?

[Answer] There is no delay. Agreement on unity in its broadlines exists between the Yemeni leaderships in the south and in the north. The only thing is that we want to establish unity on sound and solid bases. That's why joint committees were formed between the two parts of Yemen. There are political, constitutional,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

economic and educational committees. These committees have nearly completed their work. The constitutional committee is putting the final touches to the constitution of the unity states and will hold its final meeting in December.

- Meetings between the two parts of Yemen are taking place regularly and at all levels. There is an agreement in principle that the two Yemeni presidents will meet to review unity issues. The last meeting was held in June 1980. The recent meeting between the two presidents in San'a' was very important because they agreed that the unity committees should complete their work. A new committee was formed to review what has been accomplished by the various committees. It will prepare a report to be submitted to the two presidents in November on the occasion of South Yemen's independence anniversary.

[Question] What are the broadlines of the constitution that have been agreed on so far?

[Answer] The constitution of the unity states adopts the Islamic and Arab ideology, that is a pan-Arab policy and Islam.

[Question] Do you believe that the leadership in the southern part will agree to this constitution?

[Answer] First, the constitutional committee which has approved these broadlines of the constitution, comprises the two countries' justice ministers and legal experts and advisors from the south and the north. Second, the constitution will be submitted to the entire Yemeni people for approval and they will have the final say on it. The political leaderships in the two countries will have to accept the people's wish.

COPYRIGHT: [1981] AL WATAN AL ARABI

CSO: 4404/54

=

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

JETS ATTACK GUERRILLA STRONGHOLDS--Beirut, 25 Sep (REUTER)--North Yemeni jets have attacked leftist guerrilla strongholds in the south of the country in recent weeks, North Yemeni sources said today. The pro-government sources said North Yemeni troops had also been in action against the guerrillas who control a strip of rugged terrain bordering Marxist South Yemen. They described the encounters as skirmishes. The rebels, numbering several thousand, belong to the National Democratic Front (NDF). The sources said the rebels were receiving arms from Libya, South Yemen and Ethiopia. The Beirut magazine AN-NAHAR AL-ARABI WA AD-DUWALI said the clashes were apparently designed to put pressure on North Yemen. The two Yemens have previously declared a wish to unite but have been prevented by political differences and objections from Saudi Arabia. AN-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AD-DUWALI said Libya might be trying to [words indistinct] the merger by helping the rebels topple the San'a' government. [Text] [JN251710 London REUTER in English 1635 GMT 25 Sep 81]

CSO: 4400/26

END

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY